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During the past decade, federal telecommunications regulatory
policy has changed its focus from a goal of universally available and
affordable residential service to one of economic efficiency. In chang-
ing its regulatory focus, the federal government has indirectly de-
prived the states of the means to accomplish their goal, which remains
one of insuring universally available and affordable residential service.
In his Article Professor Noam examines the evolution of the tradi-
tional federal-state coregulatory system, contrasts the emerging fed-
eral regulatory approach with the states' policies, and discusses the
reasons for federal predominance in telecommunications regulation.
He argues that the reorientation in federal regulatory policy is creat-
ing administrative problems for state regulators and will impair their
ability to attain universally available and affordable residential ser-
vice. Professor Noam predicts that if the states abandon their policy
goals in favor of the federal goals, they actually will weaken federally
inspired entry into the telecommunications industry and thus hamper
the federal government's ability to realize its goal. He concludes that
the current coregulatory system is probably not stable and that a new
intergovernmental consensus is necessary to replace the present fed-
eral dominance.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent years have witnessed a fundamental reorientation of
federal policy in the telecommunications sector. A series of actions
after 1968, culminating in the Federal Communication Commis-
sion's (FCC) 1980 Second Computer Inquiry decision1 and the
* Associate Professor of Business and Lecturer in Law, Columbia University. A.B.,
1970, Harvard University, A.M., 1972, Ph.D., 1975, J.D., 1975. The author gratefully ac-
knowledges support by the National Science Foundation (Grant #IST-82-09485), which
helped in the writing of this Article. Mark Nadel's contribution was both invaluable and
excellent. I have also benefited from the help of Michael Botein, John Chapman, and Harry
Trebing, and from the assistance of Florence Ling and Virginia Marion. Special and warm
thanks go to my wife Nadine Strossen, my favorite legal counsel.
1. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules & Regulations (Second Com-
puter Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, modified on reconsideration, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980), modi-
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1982 American Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) di-
vestiture decree,2 greatly transformed the once rigorous controls
that the FCC and the Justice Department (the latter through its
1956 consent decree with AT&T) imposed on telecommunications.
In a federal system policy changes at one level of governmental
regulation have ramifications on the regulation by other levels, and
the telecommunications sector is no exception. Major changes in
the nature of the federal-state relationship in communications reg-
ulation have accompanied the dynamic development and applica-
tion of communications technology.
The system of federal and state responsibility for communica-
tions regulation traditionally had been one of coregulation. A high
degree of commonality of federal and state goals existed in this
system. The cooperative spirit was so great that the federal level
permitted major revenue transfers to the states' domain to allevi-
ate local rate pressures for which the federal government had no
direct oversight responsibility.4 As the 1970's unfolded, however,
the divergence in goals between the federal and state levels of gov-
ernment became pronounced. The federal redistributory or equity
goal became secondary to a pursuit of economic efficiency through
reliance on a change in markets and competition.
During the last decade the traditional system has dis-
integrated rapidly, with the federal government pursuing a funda-
mentally different policy than the states and becoming the pre-
dominant force in the shaping of telecommunications policy.5 The
federal government uses a different basic regulatory technique
than do the states and indirectly deprives them of the means to
fulfill their traditional goals. Moreover, the government legally
constrains the states' ability to pursue these objectives in alterna-
tive ways.
The purpose of this Article is to illuminate the changes that
have occurred in communications regulation and to examine the
nature of federal and state responsibilities in the area of telecom-
munications. Section II describes the evolution of the traditional
coregulatory regime; section III analyzes the federal regulatory ap-
fled on further reconsideration, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), afl'd, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
2. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 226-32 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 103 S.Ct. 1240 (1983).
3. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956).
4. See generally Ordover & Willig, Local Telephone Pricing in a Competitive Envi-
ronment, in E. NOAM, TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATION: TODAY AND TOMORROW 267 (1983).
5. See infra notes 155-93 and accompanying text.
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proach and philosophy and contrasts it with the policies of the
states. Section IV describes the way in which federal policy has
predominated in the telecommunications sector. Section V
presents the impact of federal policies on the states, and Section
VI discusses the outlook of the federal-state relation in the regula-
tion of telecommunications.
II. THE TRADITIONAL AND CHANGING ROLES OF FEDERAL AND
STATE REGULATORS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS
The traditional division of regulatory responsibility in tele-
communications is easy to summarize: the regulation of all forms
of wireless communication is exclusively federal, whereas the fed-
eral government shares regulation of wire communications with
state and local governments. The federal government shares the
regulation of telephony with the states and the regulation of cable
television primarily with the states and localities. This separation
has technological as well as historical roots. Broadcast technology
is not containable within state boundaries and requires centralized
spectrum allocation coupled with periodic international agree-
ments. The Navy was the first user of wireless communications in
the United States;6 and the technology's pre-New Deal regulatory
history was too brief to let a nonfederal tradition emerge. These
technological and historical circumstances explain the predomi-
nant federal role and the minor involvement of the states in wire-
less communications regulations. The licensing of all forms of over-
the-air transmission, therefore, has been exclusively federal. Even
parties operating solely intrastate communications are within the
domain of the federal regulators.8 Similarly state and local govern-
ments have no formal role in the licensing process of cellular radio,
a mobile telephone technology. Although localism is at the heart of
the FCC's philosophy in allocating broadcast licenses and regulat-
ing signal strength 9s-in constrast to the usually centralized and
6. See L. LicHTY & M. TOPPING, AMERICAN BROADCASTING: A SOURCE BOOK ON THE
HISTORY OF RADIO AND TELEVISION 14-15 (1975).
7. E.g., Regents of the Univ. of Ga. v. Carroll, 338 U.S. 586 (1950) (regulation of li-
censing the exclusive perogative of federal government under the Communications Act of
1934). See also Whitehurst v. Grimes, 21 F.2d 787 (E.D. Ky. 1927); Lamb v. Sutton, 164 F.
Supp. 928, afl'd, 274 F.2d 705 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 830 (1960).
8. Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720, 723 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Gregg, 5 F. Supp. 848 (S.D. Tex. 1933). But ef. McGlynn v. New Jersey Pub. Broadcasting
Auth., 88 N.J. 112, 137-42, 439 A.2d 54, 67-69 (1981) (federal regulations do not preempt
state regulation of public broadcaster's election law coverage).
9. See Walters, Freedom for Communications, in INSTEAD OF REGULATION: ALTERNA-
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:949
high-wattage European broadcasting systems-local and state gov-
ernments have not participated in broadcast licensing proceedings
other than as regular intervenors or as licensees of public broad-
cast stations themselves."0
Over-the-air transmission comes in a variety of forms. The
FCC has federal jurisdiction over all civilian applications including
radio broadcasting;1 television;1 2 satellite communications;13 radio
telephony, paging, cellular radio;' 4 standard point-to-point micro-
wave transmission;15 multipoint distribution system transmission; 6
digital termination service; 17 amateur radio;'8 and citizens' band.'
In addition, the FCC has expanded its regulatory oversight to non-
broadcasters by linking them to broadcasting. In cable television,
for example, the regulatory nexus was both the cable operator's use
of microwave transmission to import programming, and cable
transmission's ancillary relationship to broadcasting.2 0 The FCC
TIVES TO FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 99-111 (R. Poole, ed. 1982).
10. See infra text accompanying notes 50-59.
11. See Title III of the Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976).
12. Id.
13. Inquiry into the development of regulatory policy in regard to Direct Broadcast
Satellites for the period following the 1983 Regional Admin. Radio Conference, 90 F.C.C.2d
676 (1982); Establishment of Domestic Communication-Satellite Facilities by nongovern-
mental Entities, 22 F.C.C.2d 86 (1970).
14. See An Inquiry Into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz & 870-890 MHz for Cellu-
lar Communications Sys.; and Amendment of Parts 2 & 22 of the Comm'n's Rules Relative
to Cellular Communications Sys., 86 F.C.C.2d 469 (1981); Special Report: Cellular Radio,
BROADCASTING, June 7, 1982, at 38; id., June 14, 1982, at 60.
15. See 47 C.F.R. § 21.7 (1982).
16. See Amendment of Parts 1, 2, 21, & 43 of the Comm'n's Rules & Regulations To
provide for Licensing & Regulation of Common Carrier Radio Stations in the Multipoint
Distribution Service, 45 F.C.C.2d 616 (1974), modified, Amending Rules in the Multipoint
Distribution Service, the Instructional Television Fixed Service & the Private Operational-
Fixed Microwave Service, 45 Fed. Reg. 29350 (1980) (amending 47 C.F.R. Parts 21, 74 and
94), modified, Various methods of transmitting program material to hotels & similar loca-
tions & Use of the Business Radio Service for the transmission of motion pictures or other
program material to hotels or other similar points, 86 F.C.C.2d 299 (1981); see BROADCAST-
ING, Aug. 9, 1982, at 28.
17. See Amendment of Parts 2, 21, 87, and 90 of the Comm'n's Rules to Allocate Spec-
trum for, & to Establish Other Rules & Policies Pertaining to, the Use of Radio in Digital
Termination Systems for the Provision of digital communications services, 86 F.C.C.2d 360
(1981), modified, 90 F.C.C.2d 319 (1982).
18. See 47 C.F.R. § 97.1 (1982).
19. See id. § 95.603.
20. Courts upheld FCC regulation of cable's use of microwave transmission in Carter
Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 32 F.C.C. 459 (1962), afl'd, 321 F.2d 359 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 375 U.S. 951 (1963), which the FCC formalized in First Report and Order, 38
F.C.C. 683 (1965), and subsequently extended to cable operators who did not use microwave
in Second Report and Order, 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966). The Supreme Court upheld FCC juris-
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also has established some measure of indirect regulatory control
over the television networks21 through its power to license broad-
cast stations either affiliated with or owned by the networks.
22
Thus, from the beginning courts have recognized the federal
government's preemptive authority to regulate the use of radio
spectrum. 23 Judicial decisions have supported the position that the
use of radio services is entirely an interstate matter, even if recep-
tion is not possible across a state line. 4 The federal government, in
effect, has had exclusive jurisdiction over wireless
communications.25
The division of authority in telephone regulation is much
more complex than in over-the-air regulation. Telephone signals
follow specific paths and are not inherently interstate in character.
In addition, for several decades before federal intervention, the
medium established a strong tradition of state or local regulation"
partly because wire transmission requires the use of public rights
of way, which traditionally are subject to state control.2 7 Further-
more, telephony tends to have natural monopoly characteristics
diction over this as ancillary to broadcasting in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,
392 U.S. 157 (1968).
21. See Krattenmaker & Metzger, FCC Regulatory Authority Over Commercial Tele-
vision Networks: The Role of Ancillary Jursidiction, 77 Nw. U.L. REv. 403 (1982).
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., Allen B. Dumont Laboratories, Inc. v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir.), cert
denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1950); Tampa Times Co. v. Burnett, 45 F. Supp. 166 (S.D. Fla. 1942);
NBC v. Board of Pub. Util. Comm'rs, 25 F. Supp. 761 (D.N.J. 1938). But see Commercial
Communications, Inc. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 50 Cal. 2d 512, 327 P.2d 513 (1958), cert.
denied, 395 U.S. 341 (1959) (per curiam) (motion to dismiss appeal granted and appeal
treated as writ of certiorari, which was denied).
24. See, e.g., Gagliardo v. United States, 366 F.2d 720 (9th Cir. 1966).
25. On occasion, federal, state, and local regulations may be in conflict on issues con-
cerning physical facilities. For example, the FCC may permit broadcasters, including radio
amateurs, to erect antennas of a certain height, see 47 C.F.R. § 97.45 (a)(1) (1976), while
local government ordinances prohibit such heights. Since the reception of a broadcast signal
depends on transmission antenna strength, this local regulation interferes with interstate
broadcast activity. Comment, Local Regulation of Amateur Radio Antennae and the Doc-
trine of Federal Preemption: The Reaches of Federalism, 9 PAc. L.J. 1041 (1978).
26. For a general review of the telephone industry during this period, see Walters,
supra note 9, at 116-23; Gabel, The Early Competitive Era in Telephone Communications,
1893-1920, 34 LAw & CONTMsP. PROBS. 340 (1969). An especially helpful survey is Note,
Administrative Agencies-Separating the Jurisdictional Authorities of State and Federal
Administrators in the Regulation of the Physical Equipment Within the Nation's Tele-
phone Network, North Carolina Until. Comm'n v. Federal Communications Comm'n, 537
F.2d 787, cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 651 (1976), 8 U. TOL. L. Rav. 733 (1977).
27. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 315 (1967) ("We have consist-
ently recognized the strong interest of state and local governments in regulating the use of
their streets and other public places.").
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such as high fixed costs, relatively low variable costs, and network
externalities-that is, additional users benefit previous users.28
These conditions favored single firm production in a given area,
which in turn lead utility rate regulation-the traditional response
to natural monopolies, and a remedy historically within the juris-
diction of state and local governments.2 9
While state involvement in telephone services dates to the
1880's,30 and regulation by state commission began in 1907,31 over
time the emerging interstate telephone network also called for
some federal responsibility. Therefore, the Mann-Elkins Act,
32
which Congress passed in 1910, extended some undefined regula-
tory authority to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC). Al-
though the ICC largely failed to exercise this authority in its early
years, it did actively establish a position of dominance over state
regulation of railroad transportation in the "Shreveport Rate
Cases."33 By analogy to the Shreveport cases, the states' authority
in the telephone area became tenuous; the states ultimately were
only as powerful as the ICC allowed them to be, even though
barely two percent of telephone messages were interstate.s4
The Communications Act of 193485 merged the ineffectual
Federal Radio Commission's authority and the ICC's telephone ju-
risdiction into the newly created Federal Communications Com-
mission" and increased and clarified that agency's mandate.3 7 At
the same time, the states urged a statutory limitation of the FCC's
28. See infra note 157 for a definition of network externalities.
29. The Supreme Court accepted state regulation of telephone companies in Home
Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265, 271 (1908).
30. Gabel, supra note 26, at 355.
31. Id.
32. Act of June 18, 1910, ch. 309, § 7, 36 Stat. 539, 544-47 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 49 U.S.C. (1976)). See Note, supra note 26, at 737 n.15.
33. The Shreveport Rate Cases greatly expanded ICC authority over the railroads at
the expense of state regulators. The Court based its decisions on the power that the com-
merce clause grants to the federal government. See, e.g., Railroad Comm'n of Wis. v. Chi-
cago B. & Q. R.R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922); Houston, E. & W. Tex. Ry. v. United States, 234
U.S. 342 (1914) (The Shreveport case); Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911).
See generally Note, supra note 26, at 737-43 (discussion of the effect of the Shreveport Rate
Cases on ICC authority).
34. 78 CONG. REc. 10316 (1934) (statement of Rep. Merritt); see H.R. REP. No. 1850,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 (1934) (explaining the general provisions of the Communications Act
of 1934, which does not apply to purely intrastate businesses).
35. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1976) (amended 1981 and 1978).
36. Id. §§ 154-155.
37. See Wheat, The Regulation of Interstate Telephone Rates, 51 HAv. L. REV. 846,
848-49 (1938).
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authority over intrastate wire communications, and Congress re-
sponded by adding to the Act sections 2(b)3 8 and 221(b).39 Section
2(b), which applies only to the first section of the Act, prohibits
FCC regulation "in connection with intrastate communication ser-
vice by wire .... 24o The first section of the Act defines the sepa-
ration between interstate and intrastate communications and pro-
vides that interstate communications fall within the jurisdiction of
the FCC.41 Section 221(b) defines the divisional point in the tele-
phone network. The separation occurs at the local exchange facil-
ity.42 Hence, the interstate domain consists of those services and
their facilities that lie between local exchanges and that cross in-
terstate lines.43 The congressional intent clearly was to limit the
scope of federal telephone regulation.44 Thus the House reported
that "some 971/2 or 98 percent of all telephone communication is
intrastate, which this bill does not affect.
'45
Despite the statutory language, however, the physical network
facilities are not neatly separable into their intrastate and inter-
state components. On the contrary, they fulfill both functions si-
multaneously. During the era following the 1934 Act, public policy-
makers were under continuous pressure to reconcile the statutory
fiction of separation with the reality of integration. What emerged
from these efforts was a system of coregulation, in which both fed-
eral and state agencies regulated the same facilities at the same
time. Two circumstances facilitated the development of this sys-
tem. First, for many years the Commission's regulatory priority
was broadcasting, particularly as television grew. Second, the gen-
38. Pub. L. No. 83-345, § 1, ch. 175, 68 Stat. 63, 63-64 (codified as amended at 47
U.S.C. § 152(b) (1976)). The provision reads:
Subject to the provisions of section 301 . . . [relating to radio and television],
nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply to or to give the Commission juris-
diction with respect to (1) charges, classifications, practices, services, facilities, or regu-
lations for or in connection with intrastate communication service by wire or radio of
any carrier ....
39. Pub. L. No. 83-345, § 4, ch. 175, 68 Stat. 63, 64 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §
221(b) (1976)).
40. 47 U.S.C. § 152(b) (1976) (amended 1981 and 1978).
41. Id. § 151.
42. Id. § 221(b); Note, supra note 26, at 747.
43. Id; see Kitchen v. FCC, 464 F.2d 801 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co. v. United States, 45 F. Supp. 403 (W.D. Mo. 1942).
44. See Note, supra note 26, at 748-49. Congress did grant the FCC power, which was
not limited to interstate telecommunications, to establish a uniform system of accounting.
47 U.S.C. § 220 (1976).
45. 78 CONG. Rac. 10316 (1934)(statement of Rep. Merritt); see H.R. REP. No. 1850,
73d Cong., 2d Sess. 4-7 (1934).
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eral regulatory philosophy of the FCC was similar to that of the
state commissions: a commitment to universal service, affordable
rates to residential subscribers, and a unified national network
based on the integrity of AT&T.46 The coregulatory regime was es-
sentially cooperative. Because federal and state regulators shaped
the goal of equity-universal service and affordable rates-the
FCC even provided states indirectly with the means to maintain
low local exchange rates, by regulating rates at a relatively high
level and permitting a cost recovery above its actual contribution. 7
Thus, in an unusually cooperative stance, the FCC alleviated the
pressures on other regulatory bodies.
The cooperative system, however, could not last when its con-
stituents' fundamental goals diverged. This divergence of goals oc-
curred when the FCC began to embrace the concepts of efficiency,
competition, markets, and entry, while the state commissions con-
tinued to emphasize equity and redistribution. The split emerged
first in the accessory equipment area. In a series of decisions cul-
minating in Carterfone and the equipment registration decision,8
the FCC opened the accessory equipment market to rivals of
AT&T's manufacturing arm, Western Electric. The states, on the
other hand, advocated a restrictive approach during this period,
largely for fear of losing the subsidy to residential rates that the
liberalization would cause. The states adopted AT&T's arguments
concerning the effect of residential rate subsidies and echoed the
estimates of experts who predicted that subscriber rates would in-
crease by as much as seventy-six percent. 9
46. See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976) (amended 1981 and 1978).
47. See infra note 159 and accompanying text.
48. See Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Use of
the Carterfone Device, 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968); Proposals for New or Revised Classes of
Interstate and Foreign Message Toll Telephone Service (MTS) and Wide Area Telephone
Service (WATS), 56 F.C.C.2d 593 (1975), aff'd sub nom. North Carolina Util. Comm'n v.
FCC, 552 F.2d 1036 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 874 (1977) (equipment registration
decision); Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420 (1968);
Jordaphone Corp. v. United States, 18 F.C.C. 644 (1954); Use of Recording Devices in Con-
nection with Tel. Serv., 11 F.C.C. 1033 (1947).
49. See Domestic Common Carrier Regulation: Hearing on H.R. 7047 Before the Sub-
cofnm. on Communications of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th
Cong., 1st Sess. 263-64 (1975) (statement of Professor E. V. Rostow). The estimate of the
National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners had been a reduction of $2.4 bil-
lion in residential rate subsidies between 1975 and 1980. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util.
Comm'rs (NARUC), Report After Investigation (May 15, 1974), reprinted in The Industrial
Reorganization Act: Hearings on S. 1167 Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust and Monopoly
of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess, pt. 2, at 4460, 4505-19 (1973).
See Comment, Competition in the Telephone Equipment Industry: Beyond Telerent, 86
956 [Vol. 36:949
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Several states attempted to impose restrictions notwithstand-
ing the FCC's actions, but the Commission prevailed in the courts
in North Carolina Utilities Commission v. FCC.50 The separation
of interstate and intrastate communications by sections 2(b) and
221(b), the legal linchpins of the cooperative system, did not sur-
vive this decision. Instead, the court found that state action had
frustrated the Commission's efforts to discharge its responsibilities
under sections 201 through 205 of the 1934 Act to create a national
system of telecommunications. 1 The state action, therefore, was
invalid. The court read section 2(b) to apply only when intrastate
networks were "in their nature and effect. . .[separate] from and
• ..not substantially affect[ing] the conduct or development of in-
terstate communications. ' 52 This narrow interpretation rendered
the section meaningless since the integration of interstate and in-
trastate aspects of telephone communications exists nearly every-
where. If virtually all facilities of a nationwide network are part of
the interstate network, FCC jurisdiction extends to all aspects, and
the federal preemption relegates the states to a dependent role.
Hence, state regulation of telephone service, in the presence of an
articulated FCC policy, is largely at the sufferance of the FCC, and
state regulation in the broadcast field is nonexistent.
The deregulation of terminal equipment was only one part of
the Commission's evolving policy of substantial entry decontrol;
other areas in which the Commission's policies differed from State
policies also emerged during this time. In a major departure from
the previous policy of maintaining AT&T's long distance monop-
oly, the FCC opened the long distance market to new entrants. De-
parting cautiously from its 1959 Allocation of the Frequencies in
the Bands Above 890 Mz5 s decision, the agency successively liber-
alized entry in Microwave Communications, Inc.5 4 (1969), in Spe-
cialized Common Carrier Services55 (1971), and in Establishment
YALE L.J. 538, 548 n.44 (1977).
50. 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976). See Note, supra note
26, at 758-61; Comment, supra note 49, at 540-44.
51. 537 F.2d at 793.
52. Id.
53. 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959), on reconsideration, 29 F.C.C. 825 (1960).
54. 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969), on reconsideration, 21 F.C.C.2d 190 (1970).
55. Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration of Application to Pro-
vide Specialized Common Carrier Services in the Domestic Point-to-Point Microwave Radio
Service and Proposed Amendments to Parts 21, 43, & 61 of the Comm'n's Rules, 29
F.C.C.2d 870 (1971), afl'd sub nom. Washington Util. & Transp. v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied sub noma. National Ass'n of Regulatory Util. Comm'rs v. FCC, 423 U.S.
836 (1975).
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of Domestic Communications Satellite Facilities by Nongovern-
ment Entities (Domsat)5 6 in 1972, and finally, compelled by the
courts in the Execunet cases (1977 and 1978). 7 Again, the states
generally opposed the decontrol, but did not prevail.
In its Second Computer Inquiry decision,58 the FCC made an-
other major policy change by permitting telephone carriers to pro-
vide enhanced unregulated services, deregulating new terminal
equipment, and freeing the new equipment from state tariffing.
The decision required AT&T to separate these activities structur-
ally from its regulated activities.59 Again the states were unsuccess-
ful in their opposition to decontrol.
Similarly, in the broadcast area the Commission encouraged
the entry of new technologies to supplement traditional VHF and
UHF broadcasters. The FCC permitted pay-broadcasting televi-
sion, that is, subscription television (STV), 60 as well as Low Power
Television (LPTV),el to make new uses of the VHF/UHF frequen-
cies. In addition, the Commission allocated microwave frequencies
to common carrier Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS),6 2 and
56. 35 F.C.C.2d 844 (1972).
57. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert. de-
nied, 434 U.S. 1040 (1978) (Execunet I); MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d
590 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 980 (1978) (Execunet II).
58. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules & Regulations (Second Com-
puter Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, modified on reconsideration, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980), modi-
fied on further reconsideration, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), af'd, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
59. 77 F.C.C.2d at 461-87.
60. Amendment of Part 73 of the Comm'n's Rules & Regulations (Radio Broadcast
Services) To Provide for Subsciption Television Service, 15 F.C.C.2d 466 (1968), aff'd sub
nom. National Ass'n of Theatre Owners v. FCC, 420 F.2d 194 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
397 U.S. 922 (1970). The rules were modified most recently in Amendment of Part 73 of the
Comm'n's Rules & Regulations In Regard to Section 73.642(a)(3) and Other Aspects of the
Subscription Television Service, 90 F.C.C.2d 341 (1982). As of May 1, 1982, 27 subscription
television stations operated in 18 different markets. Amendment of Part 73, 90 F.C.C.2d at
344. See also Special Report: Subscription Television, BROADCASTING, Aug. 16, 1982, at 33.
61. An Inquiry into Future Role of Low Power Television Broadcasting and Television
Translators in the National Telecommunications System, 51 Rad. Reg. 2d (P & F) 476
(1982); see also BROADCASTING, May 17, 1982, at 65. LPTV service uses weak signals (less
than 1000 watts of power to broadcast over a radius of approximately 25 miles).
62. Amendment of Parts 1, 2, 21, & 43 of the Comm'n's Rules & Regulations To Pro-
vide for Licensing & Regulation of Common Carrier Radio Stations in the Multipoint Dis-
tribution Service, 45 F.C.C.2d 616 (1974), modified, Amending Rules in the Multipoint Dis-
tribution Service, the Instructional Television Fixed Service, and the Private Operational-
Fixed Microwave Service, 45 Fed. Reg. 29350 (1980) (amending 47 C.F.R. Parts 21, 74, and
94), modified, Various methods of transmitting program material to hotels & similar loca-
tions & Use of the Business Radio Service for the transmission of motion pictures of other
program Material to hotels or other similar points, 86 F.C.C.2d 299 (1981); see BROADCAST-
ING, Aug. 9, 1982, at 28. Multipoint distribution service utilizes microware frequencies to
broadcast over a radius of approximately 25 miles.
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perhaps most importantly, approved the use of Direct Broadcast
Satellites (DBS). 3 The FCC now has begun to open the way for
"bypass technologies" that are able to provide alternatives to local
distributions by telephone companies. Thus, in 1981 the Commis-
sion allocated radio frequency spectrum to Digital Termination
Systems (DTS)"I and began to process applications. The Commis-
sion also has approved another related technology, cellular radio. 5
In addition, the FCC permitted AT&T to offer overseas communi-
cations service in competition with the International Record Carri-
ers (IRC).66 Furthermore, the FCC has opened the international
communications market to Western Union6 7 as well as the domes-
tic market to the IRCs.
6 8
During the time that the FCC was changing its dereguatory
policy to favor entry, another federal agency, the Antitrust Divi-
sion of the United States Department of Justice, was pursuing an
important attack against concentration in the communications in-
dustry. In 1974 the Justice Department brought an antitrust suit
against AT&T to force divestiture of its subsidiary Western Elec-
tric and of the regional Bell Operating Companies (BOCs). 9 In the
dramatic January 1982 consent agreement that settled the case,
AT&T agreed to divest itself of the BOCs, which henceforth would
perform only regulated local exchange functions. The remaining
AT&T Company would provide interexchange service, produce ter-
minal equipment, and provide other unregulated services through
63. Inquiry into the development of regulatory policy in regard to Direct Broadcast
Satellites for the period following the 1983 Regional Administrative Radio Conference, 90
F.C.C.2d 676 (1982); see Evanow, 30 Million Dishes 30 Million Homes, CABLEVISION, Sept. 6,
1982, at PLUS 20.
64. Amendment of Parts 2, 21, 87, and 90 of the Comm'n's Rules to Allocate Spectrum
for, and to Establish other Rules and Policies Pertaining to, the Use of Radio in Digital
Termination Systems for the Provision of digital communications services, 86 F.C.C.2d 360
(1981), modified, 90 F.C.C.2d 319 (1982). Digital termination systems are local distribution
services that transmit high speed digital data traffic over microwave frequencies. The alloca-
tion was sufficient to accommodate up to seven extended networks, which would provide
service to 30 or more standard metropolitan areas and to six limited networks. Id. at 369-71,
373-74.
65. See supra note 14.
66. Inquiry Into Policy to be Followed in Future Authorization of Overseas Dataphone
Service, 57 F.C.C.2d 705 (1976).
67. See Western Union Int'l, Inc., 76 F.C.C.2d 166 (1980).
68. See International Record Carriers' Scope of Operations in the Continental United
States, including possible revisions to the formula prescribed under Section 222 of the Com-
munications Act, 76 F.C.C.2d 115 (1980).
69. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (action filed Nov. 20,
1974).
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its fully separated subsidiaries.7 The consent agreement required
the newly formed local companies to offer nondiscriminatory ac-
cess to all AT&T competitors in the interexchange market. The
states vigorously opposed many of the settlement terms, but their
objections did not sway Judge Greene, who approved the decree
with minor modifications.
7 1
Cable television, a hybrid of wire transmission with a broad-
cast-type function, is regulated by local authorities in their
franchising capacity, by state agencies in several states,72 and by
the FCC.7a After initial hesitation, in 1966 the FCC imposed a
comprehensive regulatory scheme on the cable television indus-
try. " The Supreme Court in United States v. Southwestern Cable
Co. 7 5 upheld the FCC's jurisdiction, finding it "reasonably ancil-
lary" to the Commission's jurisdiction to regulate broadcasting."
The Commission's jurisdiction, however, was shaky both in terms
of law and policy. The Eighth Circuit in Midwest Video Corp. v.
FCC noted that the Commission's assertion of jurisdiction over
cable has been "consistently and continually revised, unenforced,
withdrawn, waived, and abandoned. ' 77 When the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Home Box Office,
70. Id. at 160-77. Even though BOCs do not engage directly in providing interstate
communication, they remain subject to FCC regulation through the Commission's jurisdic-
tion over interstate access charges and its potential accounting and separations authority. 47
U.S.C. §§ 201-205 (1976). Thus, the FCC retains both end-to-end jurisdiction over interstate
service and the concomitant regulatory power over inseparable intrastate aspects of
telephony.
71. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 222-32 (D.D.C. 1982), af/'d sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 103 S.Ct. 1240 (1983).
72. State statutes regulating cable vary greatly. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 16-331
(1981) (total state preemption); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 166a (West 1977) (partial state
preemption); COLO. CONsT. art. XX, § 6 (home-rule grant). See generally Briley, State In-
volvement in CATV and Other Communication Sources: A Current Review, in 2 CABLE/
BROADBAND COMMUNICATIONS BOOK 35 (M. Hollowell ed. 1980).
73. See supra note 20.
74. In re Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, To Adopt Rules and Regulations To
Govern the Grant of Authorizations in the Business Radio Service for Microwave Stations
To Relay Television Signals to Community Antenna Sys., 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966).
75. 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
76. Id. at 178. Four years later the Court recognized an even wider jurisdiction in
United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972), when it approved the FCC's
local program origination requirement for cable television systems. See Amendment of Part
74, Subpart K, of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations Relative to Community Antenna
Televisions Systems, 20 F.C.C.2d 201 (1969). The peak of federal regulation was the 1972
Third Report and Order, Cable Television, 36 F.C.C.2d 143 (1972), which specified rules
regulating cable television broadcasting.
77. 571 F.2d 1025, 1033 n.17 (8th Cir. 1978).
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Inc. v. FCC78 restricted the agency's jurisdiction over pay-cable,
and the Supreme Court in FCC v. Midwest Video Corp.79 held that
the FCC has no authority to impose common carrier regulations on
cable, and the Commission greatly accelerated its deregulation of
cable. 80 In part, the Commission perceived that because of the
heavy local involvement in cable franchising, a detailed regulation
of thousands of cable systems was far beyond its capabilities and
inclinations. 81
The demise of the cooperative era in telecommunications regu-
lations, both in shared policy goals and in the acknowledgement of
the spheres of federal and state prerogatives, becomes clear after
observing these diverging policies of federal and state regulators.
The basic principle of the traditional coregulatory system, and the
flaw that led to its demise, was the territorial division of interstate
and intrastate communications. When this separation principle be-
came untenable because of the geographic integration of telecom-
munication facilities, the fallback definition became one of func-
tional separation, which gave each governmental level regulatory
powers over those functions of the network that historically had
been within that level's domain."' Functional separation did not
survive the decision in North Carolina Utilities Commission.83
The failure of functional separation led to the present system of
goal separation, in which efficiency goals are pursued primarily by
the federal level while equity goals are pursued by the states.
III. THE NE w FEDERAL REGULATION
The FCC has received much attention for its new policies to-
ward telecommunications regulation, which commentators gener-
ally describe as deregulatory in nature.8 ' These policies, coupled
78. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
79. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
80. The agency, however, only recently repealed its rules that limited the importation
of distant signals and permitted syndicated exclusivity. See Cable Television Syndicated
Program Exclusivity Rules, 79 F.C.C.2d 663 (1980), aff'd sub nom. Malrite T.V. of N.Y. v.
FCC, 652 F.2d 1140 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143 (1982). The Second Circuit
has sustained the FCC's supremacy over the states in pay cable televisions. Brookhaven v.
Kelly, 573 F.2d 765 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 904 (1979).
81. Cable Television, 79 F.C.C.2d at 663.
82. See Noam, The Interaction of Federal Regulation and State Regulation, 9 HoF-
STRA L. REv. 195, 196-98 (1980); Noam, Government Regulation of Business in a Federal
State: Allocation of Power Under Deregulation, 20 OSGOODE HA.L L.J. 702 (1982).
83. North Carolina Utils. Comm'n v. FCC, 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1027 (1976).
84. Special Report 1983: The Second 50 Years of the Fifth Estate, BROADcCASTING,
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with the Justice Department's AT&T divestiture agreement, how-
ever, are not deregulatory in the true sense of the word. Rather
than eliminate governmental intervention, the policies substitute a
fairly rigorous control of market structure for control over the reg-
ulator's behavior in setting prices and quality levels. Absence of
intervention does not accurately describe the federal policy. This
description mischaracterizes the disagreement between federal and
state policies as one between free-marketeers and regulators,
whereas the conflict actually is between different approaches to
regulation. Limited entry decontrol more aptly describes the fed-
eral policy in the communications sector. The FCC frequently per-
mits entry, and indeed even encourages it. The Commission, how-
ever, segregates different segments of the communications sector
from each other, and often restricts participants in one area from
entering another sector.
Despite the talk about freedom of entry and convergence of
technology, the communications sector abounds with entry restric-
tions on some of its most likely entrants-those firms already oper-
ating in other segments of the communications industry. The
divested former BOCs, for example, may not provide any
nonmonopoly service. 5 They may not enter interexchange trans-
mission or offer information services, and they cannot manufacture
equipment-although they may market it. Similarly, the FCC pro-
hibits BOCs from owning and operating cable television systems.8 6
Since the BOCs comprise two-thirds of AT&T's assets and em-
ployees, the overall effect of divestiture on the Bell System quite
possibly has been to add restrictions rather than to reduce them.
In the words of the New York State Public Services Commis-
sion staff, "[t]hese restrictions on the BOC's are tighter than the
Jan. 3, 1983, at 62. "Marketplace has become the Watchword. . . Broadcasters and others
in telecommunications... are looking forward.. . to 1983 as a year in which the transfor-
mation of their industry from one regulated by government to one regulated by the market-
place will continue." Id.
85. Other than exchange telecommunications and exchange access services, a BOC
may not offer any product or service when a substantial possibility exists that it could use
its monopoly power to impede competition in the market it seeks to enter. United States v.
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 187 (D.D.C. 1982), af'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 103
S. Ct. 1240 (1983).
86. 47 C.F.R. § 64.601(a) (1980); see Application of Telephone Companies for Section
214 Certificates for Channel Facilities Furnished to Affiliated Community Antenna Televi-
sion Systems, 21 F.C.C.2d 307 (1970). An exception to the prohibition of cross-ownership is
available through a waiver procedure for areas where cable franchises otherwise would not
exist. Id.; see Noam, Towards an Integrated Communications Market- Overcoming the Local
Monopoly of Cable Television, 34 FED. COM. L.J. 209, 243 n.152 (1982).
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1956 Decree was on AT&T,""7 and
The intent of the Decree is to promote competition and so we are at a
loss to understand why local telephone companies who have long provided
equipment and interexchange services, and who have the expertise to con-
tinue to do so, should be denied the opportunity to enter these or other com-
petitive telecommunications or information service fields .... It is clear that
such opportunities, if available to the BOC's, would promote further competi-
tion, potentially prevent market dominance by the surviving AT&T company,
permit BOC's to grow in the future and avoid the problems inherent in the
1956 Consent Decree which have already denied the public many technologi-
cal innovations, new services, and/or lower prices."
The FCC has imposed similar restrictions in the broadcast
field. The Commission still forbids commercial television networks
from owning more than seven stations." At present, they may not
own cable television franchisess° or resell programs that they origi-
nally aired,9 1 and they are subject to a ceiling of airing no more
than three hours of prime time programming per day.9 2 Cable tele-
vision operators may not own television stations broadcasting in
the area in which the cable operators are located; similarly, televi-
sion stations may not own cable networks operating in their area.93
In addition, cable television operators must carry, at no charge, the
programs of all television broadcasters in their geographical area,"
which, in effect, makes these broadcasters favored entrants in the
competition for viewers. Other structural restrictions prohibit for-
eign broadcasters from having control ownership interests in the
United States stations, or owning controlling interests in telephone
87. Communications Division & Office of Accounting and Utility Finance, New York
State Department of Public Service, Potential Impact of Modification of Final Judgement
(Consent Decree) Between United States Department of Justice and American Telephone
and Telegraph Co. on New York Telephone Company Subscribers 2 (Feb. 22, 1982) (report
prepared for the New York Public Service Commission).
88. Id. at 12.
89. 47 C.F.R. §§ 73.35, 73.240, 73.636 (1982). Congress, however, has slated this 7-7-7
rule for reconsideration. See BROADCASTING, Dec. 20, 1982, at 56.
90. Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations Rela-
tive to Community Antenna Television Systems, 39 F.C.C.2d 377 (1973). The FCC recently
has granted CBS a waiver to operate systems serving areas with a total population of 90,000,
and an FCC staff report has recommended complete repeal of this restriction. See FCC
Office of Plans and Policy, FCC Staff Report on Cable TV Cross Ownership Policies (Nov.
17, 1981) (report released for public comment).
91. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(j) (1982). The FCC is considering a repeal of these rules. See
Syndication, Financial-Interest Comments: High-Stake Rulemaking, BROADCASTING, May
2, 1983, at 58.
92. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(k) (1982).
93. Id. § 76.501 (originally adopted as § 74.1131 in Community Antenna Television
Systems, 23 F.C.C.2d 816, 823 (1970)).
94. 47 C.F.R. § 76.61 (1980).
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companies.95 The FCC has structured the cellular radio market to
consist of two services in each locality, with one assured to a local
wire-line carrier-a local telephone company-and the other as-
sured to anyone else.96
Of course, structural regulation is not a new approach. The
1913 Kingsbury commitment 7 subjected the Bell System to struc-
tural restrictions by requiring AT&T to exit from public telegra-
phy to divest itself of Western Union stock, to cease acquiring new
territories, and to interconnect with independent telephone compa-
nies. 8 Nor is structural regulation the policy that the FCC has
pursued in every instance. Indeed, the Commission has removed
some barriers that separated different communication firms. For
example, the FCC recently eliminated the careful separation of do-
mestic and international telegraphy, which Western Union and the
so-called IRCs operated respectively.99 In addition, the agency per-
mitted the IRCs to provide voice service. 100 Despite such instances
of structural decontrol, the present policies of the FCC and the
Justice Department rest strongly on the structural separation of
communication firms.
Several justifications support the FCC's structural separation
policies. First, structural separation prevents possible cross-subsi-
dization of the competitive segments of a firm's activities by the
firm's naturally monopolistic parts. A strict separation between the
two segments is necessary if sustainable entry into competitive
markets is to exist.10 1 Second, concerns of diversity, political
power, and localism concerns favor the diffusion rather than the
concentration of control over communication.0 2 Hence, the Com-
mission has placed restrictions on cross-ownership of different tele-
95. See id. § 25.390 (1981).
96. See An Inquiry into the Use of the Bands 825-845 MHz & 870-890 MHz for Cellu-
lar Communications Sys., 86 F.C.C.2d 469 (1981); Cellular Radio, BROADCASTING, June 7,
1982, at 38; BROADCASTING, June 14, 1982, at 60.
97. See Gabel, supra note 26, at 352.
98. See Trebing, A Critique of Structural Regulation in Common Carrier Telecom-
munications, in E. NoAm, supra note 4, at 125.
99. International Record Carriers' Scope of Operations in the Continental United
States, 76 F.C.C.2d 115 (1980); Western Union Int'l, Inc., 76 F.C.C.2d 166 (1980).
100. Western Union, 76 F.C.C.2d 166 (1980).
101. Clearly, if an existing firm subsidizes its competitive activities through its monop-
olistic segments, it can provide the competitive service at lower prices than can market
entrants.
102. See B. OwEN, J. BugB, & W. MANNING, TELvIsIoN ECONOMICS 49 (1974); supra




communications media and on television station ownership.103
Last, since encouraging entry into content markets such as infor-
mation services or entertainment programming strengthens the im-
portance of conduit access, structural separation may be necessary
to reduce the potential for unfair competition by a vertically in-
tegrated firm that is both an essential conduit and a content sup-
plier with other nonintegrated providers. This argument applies
primarily to the BOCs, which may not enter the content market,'
and to AT&T, which may not provide information content services
for seven years.0 5 The Commission hitherto has not used this ar-
gument in its policy toward cable television, in which integration
of conduit and content functions is increasing.106
The problems with structural regulation are several. First,
structural regulation must be recognized as a form of regulation
often quite restrictive in nature.0 7 To draw an analogy, the exclu-
sion of certain types of vehicles from a highway is at least as re-
strictive as a speed limit. Furthermore, structural regulation is not
easy to maintain in the midst of unprecedented technological
change and entrepreneurial application. A regulator can restrict
the participants in one market from entering another market only
when the technologies in question clearly are distinguishable. For
example, when cable television systems provide high-speed data
transmission, as some already have started to do,' they thereby
eventually may become subject to restrictions that the FCC im-
poses on telephone companies, such as abstention from content ac-
tivities.109 In Nebraska, for example, the Public Service Commis-
sion has ruled that the Cable company Cox of Omaha, in supplying
voice and data transmission services, is a common carrier subject
to their tariff regulation." 0
103. See 1 NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAF, FCC, NEW TLEVISION NETWORKS: ENTRY,
JURISDICTION, OWNERSHIP AND REGULATION 305-24 (1980).
104. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 187 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1240 (1983).
105. Id. at 180-86.
106. See Noam, supra note 86, at 216-24. For a proposal to alleviate anticompetitive
behavior in the cable industry without imposing strict separation between content and con-
duit, see Nadel, COMCAR: A Marketplace Cable Television Franchise Structure, 20 HARv.
J. LEG. 541 (1983).
107. See supra text accompanying notes 83-96.
108. See K. KALBA, SEPARATING CONTENT FROM CoNDurr? 79-83 (1977).
109. Noam, supra note 86, at 222 n.58.
110. CABLEVISION, May 9, 1983, at 15. The New York State Public Service Commission
has initiated a proceeding to clarify the scope of its common carrier regulatory powers in a
market overlap situation. New York Pub. Serv. Comm'n, Notice of Intent, Case 27091 (FCC
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An example of the way in which technological developments
make structural policies obsolete is the FCC's treatment of tele-
phone companies that provide computer services. Originally, in its
1971 First Computer Inquiry decision""' the FCC favored freeing
data processing services from regulation and permitting common
carriers to enter the market through separate subsidiaries. " Al-
most immediately, the definitions of data processing and commu-
nication services that the opinion contained became obsolete, since
the emergence of distributed processing had shifted computing ac-
tivities from centralized mainframe computers to "smart" termi-
nals that are configured in networks and are under the user's con-
trol." With this new technology, the distinctions between
unregulated data processing and regulated communications func-
tions is more difficult to make." 4 To reformulate its decision, the
FCC initiated a new inquiry.11 5 The 1980 Second Computer In-
quiry decision focused on the structure under which the computer
services were provided to the consumer. The Commission sought to
distinguish between "basic" and "enhanced" transmission ser-
vices." 6 Yet the separation point between these two communica-
tion services is difficult to determine and is likely to cause contin-
ued contention.
Efficacy is another fundamental problem of structural regula-
tion. Underlying the structuralist approach is the expectation that
entry, coupled with separation of markets, will lead to cost-based
pricing through competition in prices and quality of service. In ad-
dition, proponents of structural regulation claim that it will pro-
vide users with a welcome choice, eliminate market power, and ob-
viate the need for traditional price/earnings conduct regulation.1 1 7
Whether structural regulation can accomplish these feats is ques-
Nov. 24, 1982).
111. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer
and Communication Servs. and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971), afl'd in part and rev'd in
part sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973).
112. Id. at 268-75. The decision repeatedly stressed that AT&T could not offer data
processing even through a separate subsidiary because of AT&T's 1956 consent decree,
United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 1 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956), which
precluded the company from offering data processing services. Id. at 282, 298-99, & 305.
113. Amendment of Section 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules and Regulations (Second
Computer Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, modified on reconsideration, 84 F.C.C.2d 50 (1980),
modified on reconsideration, 88 F.C.C.2d 512 (1981), af'd, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 394-95.
117. See Trebing, supra note 98.
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tionable. 118 Professor Trebing, in a recent analysis of telecommuni-
cations regulation,119 voices his skepticism about its prospects. He
observes that market shares of AT&T, the dominant firm, have
been noticeably stable in many, although not all, instances, even
after competitors' entry into parts of its business."'0 For example,
the share of the market for key type telephones that manufactur-
ers affiliated with telephone companies held merely dropped from
98.3% in 1968 to 89.4% in 1979.121 Similarly, telephone company
affiliated manufacturers of dial-in-hand set telephones lost only
4% of their 100% market share during the same period. 22 Despite
MCI's success in long distance transmission, its market share was
still only 4%, while AT&T's market share was 84.9%.123 The pri-
mary exception to the dominant firm's market share stability is
private exchanges (PBXs), for which AT&T's market share de-
clined from 93% in 1968 to 56% in 1979.124 One analyst has argued
that "AT&T will continue to enjoy significant monopoly price-set-
ting power even as its market share declines (for the terminal
equipment market). The Bell System currently has the market
power to set prices at more than 200% over cost.'
25
One reason for the persistence of high market shares or profit
rates may be the existence of economies of scale, which protect in-
cumbent firms through cost advantages. Empirical studies have es-
timated these scale economies to be moderate but persistent for
118. The legal ability to enter a market is neither sufficient nor always necessary for
competitive conditions to emerge. Theoretically, even a 100% market share may not permit
a firm to engage in monopolistic behavior if potential entrants hover at the edge of the
market, ready to enter if returns become sufficiently attractive. Economic theorists recently
have refined this argument, which the Court anticipated to some extent in FTC v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967). See Baurnol, Contestable Markets: An Uprising in the
Theory of Industry Structure, 72 AM. EcoN. Rv. 1 (1982). For a more detailed discussion
of this argument, see W. BAUMOL, J. PANZAR & &. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE
THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (1982). For a critique of the theory when applied to the
specific conditions of the telecommunications sector, see Shepherd, Concepts of Competi-
tion and Efficient Policy in The Telecommunications Sector, in E. NoAm, supra note 4, at
79.
119. See Trebing, supra note 98.
120. Id. at 140.
121. Id. at 138.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 140.
124. Id. at 138.
125. MAJORITY STAFF OF THE SUnCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS, CONSUMER PROTEC-
TION, & FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, 97TH CONG., 1ST SESS.,
TLEcOMMUNICATIONS IN TRANSITION: STATUS OF COMPETITION AND DEREGULATION IN THE
TELECOMMUNICATIONS IMUSTRY (Comm. Print 1981) (statement of Lee L. Selwyn)(cited in
Trebing, supra note 98, at 140).
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telephone interexchange service.12 Another circumstance which
supports the theory that AT&T has the ability to control price is
the provision of the 1982 divestiture agreement, giving the com-
pany control over already "embedded" technical equipment
(CPE).127 Other firms in the industry recognize AT&T's advan-
tages. For example, an internal RCA memorandum has declared,
"Should AT&T ask for, and the FCC grant, permission to incre-
mentally price private line services, all competitors would probably
be wiped out." '28 Similarly, General Electric has found that "[T]he
Bell System can provide communication facilities at a lower cost
than GE or any Special Service Carrier can. The big question is
what prices will the FCC and AT&T agree upon for bulk
services." 12 9
The dominant firm also can use incremental or marginal cost
pricing to lessen and deter competition. Theoretical studies of a
form of utility pricing known as "Ramsey pricing" have shown that
a dominant firm need only price at some optimal level above mar-
ginal cost to preclude competition.130 Given AT&T's low incremen-
tal costs, the company would be in a strong position against
entrants.
The foregoing discussion illustrates the fundamental weakness
of an entry-based policy. Although open entry-or at least the
threat of potential competitors-is necessary to achieve competi-
tive markets, it is not sufficient by itself. To assume that the de
jure removal of barriers leads to de facto competition is wishful
thinking. For sustainable entry, an entrant's costs must not be
above those of the incumbent firm or firms, and a reduction of the
incumbent's ability to cross-subsidize the contested service seg-
ment is necessary. The FCC and the Justice Department have con-
centrated on limiting cross-subsidization, and largely have disre-
garded the issue of sustainable entry in its absence.
Since the FCC has chosen an open entry approach, the federal
126. See A. PHILLIPS, THE IMPosSiBILrrY OF COMPETITION IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS:
PUBLIC POLICY GONE AwRy (Center for the Study of Organizational Innovation, University
of Pennsylvania, Discussion Paper No. 131, May 1982).
127. CPE stands for "consumer premise equipment," which is telephone equipment
already installed at a customer's office or residence.
128. Defendant's Exhibit DX-D-26-400, United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131
(D.D.C. 1982) (quoted in A. PHILLIPS, supra note 126, at 9).
129. Defendant's Exhibit DX-D-17-13, United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131
(D.D.C. 1982)(quoted in A. Phillips, supra note 126, at 8).
130. Baumol & Bradford, Optimal Departure from Marginal Cost Prising, 60 AM.
EcoN. REV. 265-83 (1970).
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policy now depends for success on the survival of entrants, which
tends to lead to a policy that focuses on ensuring the presence of
competitors rather than necessarily of competition. For example,
under the 1982 settlement, local exchange companies must give
AT&T's competitors in the interexchange markets access to the lo-
cal exchanges at the same rates they charge AT&T, even if
AT&T's large scale of operation and the resultant cost advantages
may justify a lower rate, "provided that the access is equal in type
and quality. ' 13 1 Indeed, under the FCC's recently proposed access
charge arrangement, AT&T's indirect access charges are actually
higher during a five-year transition period than are the charges of
its competitors.1 3 2 To protect competitors the FCC also has tradi-
tionally supported UHF broadcasting,1 3 3 enacted must-carry rules
for broadcasters' access into cable television networks,134 allocated
one-half of cellular radio licenses to local telephone companies,13 5
and restricted local telephone companies in providing cable televi-
sion service.138 Concerning this last measure, Commissioner Joseph
Fogarty observed:
[T]he Commission must . . . confront the possibility that the prospect of
merging fiber optic technology with the local loop of the telephone exchange
may offer "natural monopoly" economies in the provision of broadband facili-
ties and services which a sound and rational policy analysis cannot ignore. If
these economies emerge in significant magnitude, then telephone company
competition in the cable television marketplace may be "unfair" only in the
sense that it may be inherently unbeatable. If this should prove to be the
131. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131, 199 (D.D.C. 1982), afl'd sub nom.
Maryland v. United States, 103 S. Ct. 1240 (1983).
132. See Exchange Network Facilities for Interstate Access (ENFIA), 71 F.C.C.2d 440
(1979); MTS and WATS Market Structure, 90 F.C.C.2d 135 (1982).
AT&T's interexchange competitors urged the district court to withhold its approval of
the consent decree until AT&T had agreed not to seek increases in the level of Operating
Company charges to interexchange carriers, which the FCC sets. See Exchange Network
Facilities for Interstate Access (ENFIA), 90 F.C.C.2d 202 (1982), review pending sub nom.
MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, No. 82-1554 (D.C. Cir. 1982). AT&T and the other
intercity carriers initially negotiated the ENFIA agreement under the aegis of the FCC, and
the Commission recently extended these agreements for an additional two years. Exchange
Network Facilities for Interstate Access (ENFIA), 90 F.C.C.2d 6 (1982), review pending sub
nom. MCI Telecommunications Corp. v. FCC, NO. 82-1553 (D.C. Cir.). AT&T filed new
tariffs to implement the ENFIA agreement, but other carriers challenged these tariffs. The
Commission then suspended the tariffs and imposed an arbitrary interim rate until it deter-
mined the proper tariff rate under the ENFIA agreement. Its proposed new action opened
for comments in December 1982.
133. See Waiters, supra note 26, at 105-06.
134. See 47 C.F.R. § 76.61 (1982).
135. See supra note 96.
136. Applications of Tel. Cos. for § 214 Certificates for Channel Facilities Furnished to
Affiliated Community Antenna Television Systems, 21 F.C.C.2d 307 (1970).
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case, the hard but necessary answer may have to be that the public interest is
better served by such unfairness.
13 7
Whether the major intra-AT&T structural regulation under
the Second Computer Inquiry requiring a fully separated subsidi-
ary for its unregulated business will encourage neutral competition
is a debatable issue. A report of the General Accounting Office
concluded:
Separate subsidiaries, because they solve little or nothing in themselves,
imply a continuing and intensive regulatory effort, including a heavy reliance
on the very cost allocation, accounting, and auditing techniques which have
proven so troublesome, difficult, and inadequate in the past in their applica-
tion to traditional rate of return/rate base regulation and as a means of
preventing cross-subsidization of competitive offerings. Imposing a separate
subsidiary requirement on a dominant firm does little or nothing to alter the
incentives of the overall firm or make the incentives of the separate subsidi-
ary significantly different from those of the corporate parent.
1 3 8
The expectation that traditional price/earnings regulations is likely
to become unnecessary is overly optimistic in many cases. Simply
opening markets for entry does not itself create competition. The
danger exists that a regulatory body, enamored with and commit-
ted to the structural approach as a means to achieve efficiency, will
support "competition by the numbers" by accepting the existence
of several competitors as evidence of competition, even though it
means maintaining discriminatory and inefficient regulation.
IV. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
The state commissions have been remarkably insignificant
throughout the development of the federal structural policies. Al-
though the states intervened, litigated, and testified vigorously at
every stage of the process, in not one major instance did they carry
137. National Tel. Coop. Ass'n, 82 F.C.C.2d 254, 273 (1980) (Fogarty, Comm'r).
138. GENERAL AccOUNTING OFFIcE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS BY THE COMPTROLLER
GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, LEGISLATIVE AND REGULATORY ACTIONS NEEDED TO DEAL
WITH A CHANGING DOMESTIC TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 107 (1981) [hereinafter cited as
GAO REPORT]. The Report also quotes the Justice Department: "It is clear... that the
separate subsidiaries concept is likely to have a de minimis impact on remaining incentives
to'the exercise of market power ... " Id. at 108. One of the General Accounting Office's
main conclusions is that
reliance on the separate subsidiary approach presupposes continuing internal involve-
ment of the regulatory authorities. This is a conclusion of utmost importance for those
who might be tempted to conclude that the present state of competitive development
in various sectors of the industry constitutes a justification for withdrawing regulatory
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the day.
The pendulum has swung from partnership in a coregulatory
regime-at least for wire communications-to overwhelming fed-
eral predominance over the regulation of telecommunications. The
primary legal weapon that the federal government has used to
achieve its position is the doctrine of federal preemption, which
precludes local and state governments from taking actions that im-
pair federal policies.
13 9
The FCC has been outspoken in its determination not to let
states interfere with its policies. In the 1980 Competitive Carrier
proceedings, 140 the Commission stated unequivocally:
We do not intend, by concluding that non-dominant communications entities
are not subject to regulation as common carriers, to be merely opening the
way for state commissions to impose the same kind of regulation. We have
found that regulation inhibits the market forces which we believe will best
serve federal communications policies and goals .... We intend to preclude
the states from regulating non-dominant entities providing communications
services in competitive markets on an interstate basis.""
In almost all instances the courts have agreed with the
Commission.
Thus, in North Carolina Public Utilities Commission v.
FCC, 1 42 the court decided in favor of the FCC, which had provided
for the interconnection of terminal equipment by suppliers unaffil-
iated with the local telephone companies. The court held that the
FCC's regulatory authority over interstate communications in-
cludes authority over equipment, services, and facilities that are
inseparable from intrastate services.1 43 Similarly, the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld the Second
Computer Inquiry decision in Computer and Communications In-
dustry Association v. FCC14 4 against challenges by state entities,
including the California Public Utilities Commission and the Na-
tional Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners.1 45 Echoing
139. Federal regulators preempt state regulation of interstate commerce when the
need exists for a uniform national policy. See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525
(1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947); P. HOCHBERG, THE STATES
REGULATE CABLE: A LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS OF SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS 13-14 (Program on
Information Resources Policy, Harvard University, Pub. No. P-78-4, July 1978).
140. Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Competitive Carrier Services and Facili-
ties Authorizations Therefor, 84 F.C.C.2d 445 (1980).
141. Id. at 519.
142. 537 F.2d 787 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1027 (1976).
143. Id. at 793-94.
144. 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
145. Arkansas, Wisconsin, Maine, Alabama, Minnesota, Maryland, Kansas, and Con-
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North Carolina Utilities Commission, the court stated: "[W]hen
state regulation of intrastate equipment or facilities would inter-
fere with achievement of a federal regulatory total, the Commis-
sion's jurisdiction is paramount and conflicting state regulations
must necessarily yield to the federal regulatory scheme."146
Significantly, the court in Computer and Communications In-
dustry Association upheld the FCC's power to abandon an area of
traditional regulatory concern, such as the setting of CPE rates,
provided the Commission substituted other regulatory tools. For
example, the Commission required the structural separation of reg-
ulated and nonregulated activities of AT&T, the dominant car-
rier. 147 By declaring an affirmative regulatory policy not to regulate
an area, the Commission can prevent states from usurping regula-
tory authority in a particular area. To use the F.C.C.'s jurisdiction,
which derives from the regulatory mandate of the Communications
Act of 1934, as the basis both for not regulating an area and for
excluding states from doing so is an expansive interpretation of
preemption. Furthermore, under the appellate court's opinion, the
FCC is free to establish new regulatory tools as it deems necessary
in the changing telecommunications environment and in each situ-
ation it may preclude states from a nonconforming response.
The preemption issue is also present in United States v.
AT&T.1 45 Judge Greene, in his opinion affirming and modifying
the consent decree agreement between the Justice Department and
AT&T, found that federal preemption exists even before an actual
conflict arises between federal and state actions.1 49 In General
necticut were amici curiae. See id. at 202.
146. Id. at 214. The Computer and Communications Indus. Ass'n court also found
that the FCC's structural policy was not in the nature of an impingement on state regula-
tory authority: "In Computer II the Commission has [not] attempted to set rates for intra-
state communications services or facilities. . . .Rather, the Commission here exercised its
direct authority to determine the regulatory treatment of CPE used for interstate communi-
cations." Id. at 216.
147. Id. at 219.
148. 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 103 S.
Ct. 1240 (1983).
149. Judge Greene stated:
The Court must decide the preemption issue at this juncture even though no State
has yet taken specific action which conflicts with the terms of the proposed decree. In
the first place, many States have made it abundantly clear that, unless the Court acts,
they will proceed in a manner inconsistent with the decree .... Finally, the possibility
that provisions of the decree could be vetoed by regulators on a state-by-state basis,
with the resulting "balkanized scheme of telecommunications service" (Joint Com-
ments of Alabama, et al., at 12) would obviously have a bearing on the basic question
whether the proposed decree would and could effectively open the telecommunications
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Telephone Company of California v. FCC 50 then Judge Warren
Burger upheld federal jurisdiction over intrastate facilities used for
interstate services. In his opinion for the court he wrote: "Any
other determination would tend to fragment the regulation of a
communications activity which cannot be regulated on any realistic
basis except by the central authority; fifty states and myriad local
authorities cannot effectively deal with bits and pieces of what is
really a unified system of communication." '51 Similarly, when the
FCC sought to preclude the New York State Commission on Cable
Television's asserted jurisdiction over master antenna television
(MATV), the Second Circuit upheld the Commission on the
ground that state regulation could frustrate the FCC's policy of en-
couraging interstate Multipoint Distribution Services used in pay
television.
152
The FCC's string of successes is not unbroken. When the
Commission attempted to preempt state regulation of cable televi-
sion's use of two-way leased channels, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals reversed the Commission in a multiple opinion
decision, National Association of Regulatory Utility Commission-
ers v. FCC,15 3 because the FCC had failed to establish a nexus be-
tween the particular communications activity it sought to regulate
and its jurisdictional powers over broadcasting.5 4
V. THE IMPACT OF FEDERAL STRUCTURAL POLICIES ON THE STATES
The redirection of federal regulation toward a structural ap-
proach has ushered in a period of difficult adjustment for the
states. Their own regulatory priorities, which strongly reflect social
policy concerns, have not changed. Affordable residential rates,
universal service encompassing low income users and rural areas,
and the viability of local telephone companies subject to state reg-
industry to competition.
Id. at 154 n.100.
In challenging the AT&T consent decree, several states, citing National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), asserted that the decree unconstitutionally invaded powers
reserved to the states under the tenth amendment. The court dismissed this argument. 552
F. Supp. at 155-56.
150. 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969).
151. Id. at 401.
152. New York State Comm'n on Cable Television v. FCC, 669 F.2d 58, 66 (2d Cir.
1982).
153. 533 F.2d 601 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (NARUC II).
154. Id. at 615.
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ulation remain the state commissions' primary regulatory goals.155
The third of these goals is a prerequisite for achieving the first two
objectives, which concern equity and redistribution s15 and reflect
the political and historical context for the Commissions' raison
d'&tre. These goals have not changed in the past decade. If any-
thing, their public proponents have become more assertive, and the
increased panoply of services available over telephone,15 7 coupled
with the greater geographical dispersion of population, have made
access to telecommunications services more important than ever.
For a long time two circumstances contributed to the state com-
missions' ability to pursue their policy goals. First, technological
developments led to a secular decline in the cost of interexchange
service, which kept overall rate increases low. 58 Second, long dis-
tance revenues subsidized local rates in the procedures known as
separations and settlements.159 Since low income residential cus-
tomers tend to make relatively fewer long distance calls than do
business or higher-income users, the cross-subsidy benefited them.
Similarly, the low income residential customers gained from cross-
subsidized equipment lease rates.
State commissions were able to maintain their regulatory goals
through the use of revenue sources over which they had no con-
trol-interstate long distance rates that the FCC estab-
lished.' 0 -and through activities such as equipment leasing whose
revenues depended critically on market structures and entry condi-
155. See Gioia, A State Regulator's View of the Present Situation in Telecommunica-
tions and of the Changes in the Industry, in E. NoAm, supra note 4, at 183.
156. Reasons other than redistributive concerns support the concept of universal ser-
vice. The value of a telephone subscription to each customer rises with the number of reach-
able parties. Thus, each additional subscriber usually provides positive externalities to the
other customers. A purely cost-based charge ignores the positive benefit that the additional
subscriber bestows on the system. A cross-subsidy, therefore, is a way in which existing
users encourage the participation of other users whose connections in turn contribute to the
overall value of the telephone network.
157. See, e.g., Rosenberg & Hirschman, Retailing without Stores, HARv. Bus. REv.,
July-Aug. 1980, at 103.
158. See G. BROOK, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY THE DYNAMIcs OF MARKET
STRUCTURE 200 (1981).
159. In a "separations & settlements" proceeding the FCC determines the portion of
interstate revenues that it will allocate to the states. The process has three parts: During
"separation" a costing methodology serves to allocate revenues between federal and state
jurisdictions. "Settlements" refers to the actual payments from AT&T to the independent
telephone companies for the use of their local distribution systems. The apportionment of
revenue within the Bell System is called "division of revenues." See Cornell & Pelcovits,
Access Charges, Costs, and Subsidies: The Effect of Long Distance Competition on Local
Rates, in E. NoAm, supra note 4, at 307.
160. Id.
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tions that also were susceptible to FCC regulations. The system of
coregulation crumbled when the federal level of government,
spurred by technological, entrepreneurial, and ideological trends,
asserted itself and reshaped the industry structure in which the
states operated.
As part of its policy reorientation, the federal government ob-
tained the AT&T divestiture, which resulted in the loss of inter-
exchange service cross-subsidy. The effect that the loss of this rev-
enue will have on local exchange rates and on universal service is
difficult to assess because of the many variables involved." 1 The
New York State Public Services Commission's estimates show, for
example, that, depending on the assumptions relied upon, local
rates will increase between 40% and 182% .162 Commentators fre-
quently make the counterargument that increased access charges,
either to the interexchange carriers such as MCI and the remaining
AT&T, or to long distance customers, which require access, theo-
retically can offset dollar-for-dollar any increases in local rates.163
If state commissions however, seek to adhere to their fundamental
redistributional policy of subsidizing residential customers with
revenues from large business customers, a serious limit to the pol-
icy of increasing access charges arises. An increase in access
charges substantially above cost would encourage large users to
seek "bypass" technologies as an alternative to local telephone
company distribution.1 " Cable television networks,165 analog or
digital microwave systems, 6 ' in-house private exchanges (so-called
class-6 exchanges), 167 and duplicative regular telephone systems
are capable of providing local distribution services.1 e
161. According to one estimate, a doubling in prices would reduce subscribers, as a
percentage of total households, from 92% to 84%. See Defendant's Exhibit D-4-1518, Table
entitled, "Estimated Percentage of Households with Basic Telephone Service," United
States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v. United States,
103 S. Ct. 1240 (1983) (cited in Trebing, supra note 98, at 172 n.62).
162. See Gioia, supra note 156.
163. See, e.g., Ordover & Wiffig, supra note 4.
164. For a more detailed discussion of the issue of local bypass, see id.
165. See Noam, supra note 86.
166. See Amendment of Parts 2, 21, 87, and 90 of the Comm'n's Rules to Allocate
Spectrum for, and to Establish other Rules and Policies Pertaining to, the Use of Radio in
Digital Termination Systems for the Provision of Digital Communications Services, 86
F.C.C.2d 360, 361 (1981), modified, 90 F.C.C.2d 319 (1982).
167. A private branch exchange (PBX) is a customer-owned or leased telephone ex-
change serving an individual organization and connecting to a public telephone exchange.
168. See Capital Tel. Co. v. City of Schenectady, No. 82-CV-468, (N.D.N.Y. 1983)
(characteristically protective local regulators prevent approval of new telephone company's
attempt to enter market served by BOC).
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While it is not necessary that bypass technology will be com-
petitive with cost-priced telephone distribution, high access
charges may divert a significant number of major business users to
long distance carriers via non-BOC routes. Since less than eight
percent of all long distance users account for seventy-five percent
of all long distance billings,89 bypass alternatives need attract only
a relatively small number of high volume users to divert a major
share of the access charge subsidy from local exchange services. To
prevent the loss of large scale users-typically business custom-
ers-the local operating companies would have to give them re-
bates; residential customers, therefore, would have to bear a
greater share of total cost. The resulting rate increases for residen-
tial customers would be difficult for politically sensitive utility
commissions to support and would run counter to their goal of af-
fordable rates. In addition, to the extent that the FCC's access
charge policy toward interexchange carriers is uniform and nondis-
criminatory-that is, not cost-based and reflective of the Commis-
sion's desire to protect new entrants-the FCC probably will op-
pose "predatory" access rate reductions by local telephone
companies to business users.
Theoretically, state commissions could regulate bypass tech-
nology rates to prevent them from attracting much of the local
telephone companies' business. Again, however, the FCC's policy of
protecting entry likely will prevent the states from imposing bur-
dens on new entrants.7 0 Indeed, the FCC already has claimed reg-
ulatory authority over bypass technologies for local distribution.
When the Commission allocated radio spectrum to digital termina-
tion systems,1 1 it announced its intent to preempt state regula-
tion.17 2 Similarly, in New York State Commission on Cable Televi-
sion v. FCC173 the Second Circuit recognized the Commission's
preeminent interest in regulating Multipoint Distribution Services
(MDS) because of the technique's potential use in local distribu-
tion of interstate communications.
1 7 4
169. See Trebing, supra note 98, at 150.
170. See New York State Comm'n on Cable Television v. FCC, 669 F.2d 58 (2d Cir.
1982).
171. See Amendment of Parts 2, 21, 87 and 90 of the Comm'n's Rules to Allocate
Spectrum for, and to Establish Other Rules and Policies Pertaining to, the Use of Radio in
Digital Termination Systems for the Provision of Digital Communications Services, 86
F.C.C.2d 360, 361 (1981), modified, 90 F.C.C.2d 319 (1982).
172. Id. at 389-90.
173. 669 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1982).
174. Id. at 66.
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Aside from the potential loss of revenue from interstate opera-
tions, substantial reductions in the states' authority over intrastate
interexchange traffic has affected their ability to attain their regu-
latory goals. In the past, states exercised enough control over this
segment to permit them to prevent non-Bell carriers from provid-
ing such service. 17 5 This control no longer exists.176 Furthermore,
rate regulation probably will become administratively difficult be-
cause of the numerous cost and revenue allocation problems with
nationally integrated companies.
New federal policies also are creating administrative problems
for state regulators. Under the old coregulatory system, a state
commission needed to focus only on the state BOC and indepen-
dent operating companies and use their total revenues as the key
measure for setting rates. Now, however, state commissions also
must regulate the intrastate rates of interexchange carriers such as
AT&T.177 Since these carriers are parts of vast nationally inte-
grated operations, and subject to issues of cost and revenue alloca-
tion, states may have difficulty entering this area. One obvious so-
lution is to give the FCC complete authority over intrastate rates.
State officials concede that "[r]egulation of all inter-LATA traffic
by the FCC makes practical sense since the need for allocations
would be eliminated. However, it would effectively preclude a state
from the design and implementation of special rate plans, unique
peak/off-peak rates, tailored short-haul rates to reflect communi-
ties of interest .... ,*"7 Another administrative problem that the
states face is the temporary absence of historic data for the new
BOC structure to serve as a basis for evaluating rate cases. Simi-
larly, both the BOCs and the state regulatory commissions will
have difficulty forecasting access revenues, which are dependent on
interstate and inter-LATA carriers actions.
175. See Gioia, supra note 155.
176. Id.
177. As two New York State Public Service Commission officials have described the
problem:
Unlike the situation today where most functions and costs are self-contained within a
BOC and within state boundaries enabling direct identification of expenses and plant
dedicated to state services, AT&T will have no such definable territory and it is doubt-
ful if many elements of cost will be incurred strictly on behalf of a given state. As a
result, complex, arbitrary and disputed cost allocation procedures will be required to
identify or apportion costs to a particular state jurisdiction.
C. Thorsen & R. Stannard, Computer II and Divestiture: A State Regulatory Framework To
do the Impossible in Twelve Months 14, Paper presented at the Fourteenth Annual Confer-
ence of the Institute of Public Utilities (Williamsburg, Virginia, Dec. 14, 1982).
178. Id. at 15.
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Defining the scope of federal and state authority over inter-
exchange and intraexchange services will raise not only jurisdic-
tional issues, but also questions concerning the characterization of
certain services as interexchange or local. The principle behind the
1982 AT&T divestiture decree was to separate interexchange and
intraexchange services.17 9 In reality, the distinction between the
two types of services often is not clear. For example, the FCC tar-
iffs and defines certain services such as message toll telephone ser-
vice (MTS) and wide area telephone service (WATS)1 s0 as inter-
exchange services, while it identifies and prices private line foreign
exchange services (FXs), which permit users to place local calls
through a distant switching center, 81 as local services.18 2 No func-
tional difference, however, exists between the interconnection ar-
rangement for FXs and WATS customers. To avoid distortions, ac-
cess charges for both types of services must be similar. Federal-
state coordination, or more likely, FCC predominance over all ac-
cess charge regulation probably will be necessary to achieve consis-
tent rates.1 88
Similar problems may arise in the terminal equipment and en-
hanced communications services areas. Under the Second Com-
puter Inquiry decision the FCC ordered the removal of CPE
charges from state tariffs and entirely preempted state regulatory
authority over CPE.184 The resulting unbundling of CPE charges
and regulated basic transmission charges caused states to lose con-
trol over revenues from terminal equipment that could subsidize
local rates. The FCC decision also imposed an administrative bur-
den on the states by requiring them to separate enhanced services
from basic transmission services.1 85 Although the Commission per-
179. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 141-42.
180. Message toll telephone service (MTS) is a long distance communications service
permitting subscribers to locate exchange services in separate areas to establish two way
telecommunications on a message-by-message basis. Wide area telephone service (WATS)
permits telephone users to place an unrestricted number of calls in specific areas at a single
overall rate. See Trebing, supra note 98, at 132.
181. See United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 161 n.124.
182. Id. at 161.
183. See R. Bruce, Entering and Existing the Access Labyrinth: Regulatory and Judi-
cial Background and Policy Initiatives for the Future 30-32 (Sept. 16, 1982) (unpublished
manuscript).
184. Amendment of § 64.702 of the Comm'n's Rules & Regulations (Second Computer
Inquiry), 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 439-46 (1980).
185. Under the FCC's Second Computer Inquiry decision, which preceeded the AT&T
divestiture agreement by two years, basic transmission services, whose intrastate aspects the
states regulated, were to be separate from enhanced services. The supervision of the separa-
tion on the state level was to have been the responsibility of the state commissions. Second
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mits the states to regulate the latter services, it forbids them from
setting rates for the entire range of enhanced telecommunication
services.186 In addition, the FCC has authority to set the dividing
line between the two types of services and alter it as technology
develops. 187 Thus, the scope of state regulation is within the not
necessarily consistent hands of the federal agency. Furthermore, by
giving AT&T and its fully separated subsidiary, rather than the
BOCs, authority to provide enchanced services, the FCC has lim-
ited the possibility that revenues from these services can subsidize
local rates.188 Rather than helping to subsidize state-set basic resi-
dential rates, enhanced services will contribute only to the reve-
nues of the parent company outside of state rate-of-return regula-
tory authority.
The burden on the state regulators and the pressure on local
rates are likely to increase because of the changes in the account-
ing treatment of depreciation. AT&T successfully petitioned the
FCC to adopt new depreciation rules that permit speedier cost re-
covery by allowing the use of the "equal life groups" depreciation
method rather than the "vintage groups" method."l 9 Similarly, the
FCC replaced the whole-life straight line depreciation system with
remaining life depreciation,19" and adopted a reassessment of ser-
vice life. In addition, these changes allow a telephone company to
depreciate more rapidly, which normally justifies an increase in lo-
cal exchange rates to offset the added cost. The changes do create
difficulties in administration. A report by the General Accounting
Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d at 428-30. The AT&T divestiture agreement changed this
arrangement by authorizing AT&T, not the BOCs, to provide enhanced services and to own
embedded CPE. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 192. Hence, the states must regu-
late AT&T rather than the BOCs in the latter two areas. Under the original divestiture
decree, the BOCs could not enter markets other than regulated basic exchange service. Id.
at 138. Therefore, the state commissions did not need to supervise or separate any unregu-
lated competitive services. Judge Greene, however, modified the decree to permit BOC entry
into CPE marketing, which is a competitive service that the state does not regulate under
Second Computer Inquiry. See id. at 191-93. The question thus arises within what kind of
separated structure a BOC can provide CPE services. The FCC probably will examine the
logic of the Second Computer Inquiry full separated subsidiary approach as it applies to the
divested successor companies and will adopt a similar arrangement for BOCs. Under this
approach, the state commissions would bear the regulatory burden of separating CPE from
intrastate exchange services.
186. Second Computer Inquiry, 77 F.C.C.2d at 430.
187. See Computer & Communications Indus. Ass'n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 204 & n.12
(2d Cir. 1982).
188. See supra note 185.
189. See Trebing, supra note 98, at 145.
190. See id.
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Office1 91 describes the difficulties that the new depreciation rules
present, including problems in gathering data, the need to rely on
hypothetical engineering judgments, and the questionable ability
of state commissioners to check and monitor the accuracy of de-
preciation accruals. 192
VI. OUTLOOK
If federal goals and actions have dominated the recent history
of federal and state division of responsibility in the regulation of
telecommunications, what is the outlook for the near future? To
attempt an answer, of course, is to invite speculation.
The strict separation of the BOCs from competitive services is
intellectually consistent with the theory underlying divestiture, but
its success may sow the seeds of its own destruction. With the
BOCs precluded from the major areas of new technological appli-
cations, with bypass technologies nibbling at their most profitable
customer base, and with political and economic forces constraining
their ability to obtain rates that adequately compensate them for
the loss of the interexchange subsidy, the BOCs may well deteri-
orate financially, even with increasing rates. State regulators con-
ceivably might take this opportunity to circumvent or modify the
strictness of the structural regulation. For example, the state regu-
lators may attempt to redefine local exchange areas (LATAs) to
make the BOCs essentially into intrastate interexchange carriers.
The states may also attempt to permit BOC entry into enhanced
services, either by imposing lenient tariff restrictions on their ac-
tivities, or by allowing BOCs to create separated subsidiaries os-
tensibly to market CPE but with considerable leeway to enter
other activities. The BOCs undoubtedly would prefer these mea-
sures to a free market that they could not enter. The state may
have incentive to increase the scope of price/earnings regulation in
order to circumvent the structural restrictions. In addition, state
commissions may resort to approving sophisticated forms of price
discrimination, including discounts to large users of local exchange
access to promote utilization of local exchange facilities instead of
bypass alternatives.193 This price discrimination would favor
AT&T at the expense of its competitors and would be the diamet-
ric opposite of the FCC's policy, which seeks to encourage the en-
191. See GAO REPORT, supra note 138.
192. Id. at 109-11.
193. See supra text accompanying notes 164-74.
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try of competitors. Eventually, the BOCs' revenue plight with its
distributional implications, and the companies' willingness to com-
pete actively in other markets, may lead to removal of restrictions
and BOC reentry into many of the markets that the FCC currently
has allocated to AT&T. In that event, the segmental separation
approach of the FCC and the Justice Department largely will
break down-as it must with increasingly integrated technology. In
its place will be a genuinely free entry policy, coupled with tradi-
tional price/earnings and common carrier regulation in those areas
of residual core natural monopoly that may persist for a long time.
An ample role for state regulation exists in such a system, unlike in
the deceptively simple world of separated markets that underlies
today's federal regulatory policy.
In the short run the logic of the FCC's structure policy is
likely to lead to a further restriction of local and state governmen-
tal authority. Cable television presents an especially illustrative ex-
ample. In this area the Commission already has set a ceil-
ing-currently five percent of revenues-on the local governments'
ability to impose franchise fees on cable systems.194 Indeed, this
restriction, which also limited the ability of localities to impose
mandatory channel requirements, became part of a recent Senate
bill introduced by Senator Barry Goldwater, normally a champion
of home rule and states' rights.
19 5
The trend toward increased federal restrictions on local and
state authority is not entirely surprising. A fundamental conflict
exists between the goal of deregulation and the goal of decentrali-
zation. If the primary federal aim is to reduce interferences in der-
egulatory policies, the federal regulators must prevent noncon-
forming state or local policies. They likely will do so through
preemption challenges to state and local actions.19 The next target
no doubt will be Satellite Master Antenna Systems (SMATVs),
194. The FCC explicitly limits franchise fees to 3% of gross revenues but will permit a
fee of up to 5% upon a showing by a municipality that this amount "will not interfere with
the effectuation of federal regulatory goals" and that the fee is appropriate "in light of the
planned local regulatory program." 47 C.F.R. § 76.31 (1982).
195. See S. 66, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 608 (1933); 129 CONG. REc. 88291 (daily ed.
June 14, 1983); S. 898, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); 127 CONG. REc. S11134-35 (daily ed. Oct.
6, 1981).
196. The Supreme Court's recent decision in Community Communications Co. v. City
of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40 (1982), further eroded local powers over the regulation of telecom-
munications. The Boulder Court held that absent a grant from the state, local governments
are not exempt from the antitrust laws. Id. at 56-57. Thus, additional cable companies con-
ceivably could enter selectively into an existing cable area and weaken the franchise con-
tract's redistributory provisions.
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which are small cable television operations with access to many of
the same satellite-fed pay programs. Because these systems do not
cross public property, at present they do not require a municipal
franchise and are not subject to the various requirements, such as
universal service, rate regulation, and public access channels, that
local regulators impose on cable operators. SMATV systems thus
are able to undercut local regulation by underpricing the regulated
cable operators. Local governments are beginning to consider im-
posing obligations on the SMATV systems, while the FCC views
this plan as a restriction on the entry of a new technology. In New
York State Commission on Cable Television v. FCC,197 which con-
cerned a closely related issue, the Second Circuit prevented the
state from extending its jurisdiction to MATV, a variant of
SMATV, using interstate MDS. If courts extend the principle of
this case to local SMATV regulation, the states may find it difficult
to maintain their various redistributory and access goals for cable
franchises. Again, the federal efficiency goal of encouraging addi-
tional entrants may preempt the lower governments' equity con-
cerns even though the new entries, as such, are not necessarily
more efficient.
If the new entrants are less efficient than the firms already in
the market, a fundamental irony exists. The success of the FCC's
policy of entry rests on the presence of new entrants. Yet some of
these entrants may exist or survive largely because of the equity
centered, "nonefficient" concerns of state and local regulators. If
these regulators were to adopt the federal efficiency goals entirely
the underlying cost structures in several telecommunications mar-
kets could result in monopolistic conditions. Monopolization, in
turn, would likely lead to a reemergence of more traditional forms
of conduct regulation such as price/earnings restrictions. There-
fore, the present system of federal and state regulation probably is
not stable. If states abandoned their policy aims in favor of the
federal goals, they would greatly weaken federally inspired entry of
interchange carriers such as by pass carriers, MDS, and SMATV.
The success of federal policies thus depends to some extent on the
states' maintenance of rate regulation that cross-subsidizes high
cost users with proceeds from low cost users.
While in the traditional coregulatory system federal forbear-
ance made achievement of state goals possible, the converse is true
today. Now the states, by their adherence to equity goals, provide
197. 669 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1982); see supra text accompanying note 170.
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a foundation for achieving federal policy aims. When the states be-
come unable or unwilling to follow these equity objectives, a new
intergovernmental consensus will be necessary to replace the pre-
sent federal dominance.

